When consumers concentrate their purchases at a single firm, a firm that offers more products than its rivals can gain market share for all its other products, as well.
Introduction
In many industries, buyers concentrate their purchases at a single supplier, because of transaction or switching costs. For example, many consumers shop at a single supermarket; several airlines acquire aircraft from a single manufacturer; most individuals hold checking and savings accounts with the same bank. Thus, in such industries, firms' product lines are important strategic tools that vertically differentiate competing firms. The goal of this paper is to investigate how these features-consumers deal with a single firm, and the number of products is a measure of vertical differentiation between firms-determine market conduct and market structure, with a special focus on the mutual fund industry.
With this goal in mind, the paper sets up a model that builds on Sutton's (1991) seminal endogenous sunk costs theory. On the supply side, the key idea is that offering a large number of products affects fixed rather than variable costs. On the demand side, consumers prefer firms that offer a greater variety of products. In this setting, a firm that offers more products than its rivals gains market share for its other products, as well (Klemperer and Padilla, 1997) . These spillovers induce firms to compete by offering more and more products, in an escalation mechanism akin to the form of competition observed in markets characterized by network effects (Katz and Shapiro, 1985) . The intensity of consumers' preferences for a firm's variety of products critically determines the importance of spillovers and, thus, firms' conduct and market structure. If consumers' preferences for a firm's variety of products are strong, then a family gains a proportionally larger market share when offering more products than its rivals-i.e., demand spillovers are strong. Hence, in equilibrium, firms offer a large number of products at relatively high prices. This mode of competition implies that incumbent firms incur high fixed costs, and new entrants must pay substantial setup costs to be able to compete with incumbents. Hence, the industry sustains only a few large firms and a natural form of market concentration arises. Instead, if consumers' preferences for a firm's variety of products are weak, then a firm gains a small market share when offering more products than its rivals-i.e., demand spillovers are weak. Thus, each firm offers a more-limited number of products, prices are lower, and the industry is more fragmented.
The mutual fund industry provides an ideal candidate for investigating the role of firms' variety of products and demand spillovers. First, industry data suggest that they play a role. Second, the mutual fund industry fits the key demand and supply assumptions of our model well: 1) Most investors confine their mutual fund holdings to a single fund family, for two main reasons. First, employer-sponsored retirement plans frequently offer funds belonging to a single family. For example, Huberman and Jiang (2006) , Elton, Gruber and Blake (2006) and Cohen and Schmidt (2009) study samples of 401(k) plans and document that most of them offer funds of a single family. Second, "shopping" costs (i.e., transaction, search and switching costs) induce investors to hold funds of a single family. 1 Some of these costs are monetary-a family often charges load fees when investors move assets out of the family, but not when they move assets within the family. Other costs could be psychological-the process of searching among a large number of funds across many families may be daunting. 2 As a result, Stark and Yates (2008) find that investors tend to buy funds from a single family even when they are investing through a discount brokerage firm.
2) The number of funds that a family offers plays a key role in determining choice among families. For example, when offering a retirement plan to a large number of employees with heterogeneous preferences over their portfolio choices, a family with a larger number of funds will better suit these employees. Similarly, shopping costs imply that moving money across funds of the same family is cheaper than moving money across families (Massa, 2003) . The higher the number of funds in a family, the lower are investors' costs since more funds provide greater liquidity services. In summary, the number of funds is a key characteristic that vertically differentiates families.
3) The costs structure of the industry is well described by large fixed costs and low variable costs. Indeed, the main expenses to operate a fund-such as the compensation of the fund manager and administrative costs-do not grow proportionally with total net assets.
Third, the mutual fund industry is composed of two distinct segments-retail and institutionalthat cater to different types of investors. In particular, institutional investors are usually larger and more sophisticated than retail investors (Section 3 provides more detail on the differences between segments). Hence, the difference between the benefits of finding a higherperformance or a lower-priced fund and the costs of switching across families is larger for institutional investors than for retail investors. Therefore, firms' variety of products and, thus, spillovers arguably play a different role in the two segments.
The empirical analysis of the paper starts by showing aggregate mutual fund data that reveal striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market. Specifically, in the retail segment, families offer more funds; funds have higher fees; the market is more concentrated; and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment.
These patterns are exactly the outcomes predicted by the theoretical model if preferences for firms' variety of products and spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the empirical analysis seeks to measure and compare spillovers in the two segments of the market. In particular, using CRSP data for the period 1999-2006, we examine whether families that offer a larger number of funds or a larger number of categories of funds gain a more-than-proportional market share. The main challenge to this analysis is to properly distinguish demand for firms' product portfolios from other factors-such as supply-side economies of scale-that may generate a similar relationship between number of funds/categories and market share. Hence, as in a standard demand and supply estimation, in order to identify demand for firms' product varieties, we employ variables that shift the number of funds offered by a family for supply reasons. More precisely, an influential literature has empirically documented the spatial agglomeration of firms belonging to the same industry (for a summary, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), and a few papers have shown that firms located in these areas where an industry concentrates are, on average, larger than firms in the same industry outside such areas (for evidence across industries, see Holmes and Stevens, 2002; for evidence on the mutual fund industry, see Table 1 in Christoffersen and Sarkissian, 2009). Thus, everything else equal, the supply of funds/categories should be higher if a family is located where employment in the financial sector is higher. Hence, we retrieve from CRSP the zip code of the headquarters of each family, and we match it to the total employment in the financial sector (and to the total number of establishments) of the corresponding county, retrieved from the County Business Patterns, a U.S. Census database, to obtain a measure of the density of the financial sector relative to other industries.
We find clear evidence that demand for firms' variety of products and spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment of the market. More precisely, a family that offers ten percent more funds (categories) than its rivals has a 4.8 (10.1) percent higher average per-fund market share in the retail segment, but does not gain a higher average per-fund market share in the institutional segment. We also perform our analysis at the fund and at the category level, and we find even stronger results. We further check the robustness of our results to potential concerns about the validity of the instruments using an alternative set of instrumental variables, and we find identical results.
The paper makes a number of contributions. First, the mechanisms identified in this paper are not unique to the mutual fund industry, but also help explain the role of firms' product portfolios and spillovers in a wide range of markets. In many industries, the largest firms are frequently the most successful in launching new products or entering new markets, and this paper is among the first to investigate market outcomes when consumers value firms' product-line breadth. More generally, the paper illustrates how markets operate when vertical differentiation between firms is important. Second, this paper is one of the first to investigate market conduct and market structure in the mutual fund industry, an important industry that manages a large fraction of retirement savings in the U.S. While there have been other important trends in the mutual fund industry in recent years-such as the growth of index funds and ETFs-the paper connects the industrial organization of the U.S. mutual fund industry with its largest component of demand-i.e., retirement accounts (Cohen and Schmidt, 2009 ). In doing so, the paper provides a coherent explanation for why, given the industry's total growth, the entry of new families has been limited, and the introduction of new funds by incumbent families has been more substantial. The model also provides a simple economic rationale for the limited price competition observed in the industry and for the existence of a large number of funds, both of which have been viewed as "puzzles" in the mutual fund literature (Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú, 2009; Massa, 1997). The economic mechanism proposed also matches well with key features of the industry and comments from market participants. For example, The No-Load Fund Investor, 3 a popular investment newsletter, writes: "The tremendous increase in the number of funds has been propelled by investor demand and by the need for fund groups to each offer a complete array of funds."
Related Literature
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, an influential literature studies the determinants of market structure. Most theoretical explanations focus on supplyside reasons. Sutton's seminal work highlights how endogenous sunk costs-such as advertising and R&D-affect market structure and concentration (Sutton, 1991 and 1998 fogel (2010) investigate the relationship among market size, product quality, and market concentration in two contrasting industries-daily newspapers and restaurants-that differ in whether quality is produced mainly with fixed or variable costs, respectively. The present paper displays some key differences from these empirical papers: While they exploit variation in market size to understand the nature of supply (i.e., sunk costs), we focus on two segments of the same industry that differ in their demands-more precisely, in their valuations of the endogenous characteristic supplied through fixed costs.
Some papers use demand-side arguments to explain patterns of market concentration and market power. The most closely related papers are those that investigate the effects of switching costs on firms' incentives to offer multiple products (Klemperer, 1995; Klemperer and Padilla, 1997) . Starting with Borenstein (1989 and , several empirical papers investigate the "hub-premium" in airline markets-whereby an airline with a dominant presence at an airport obtains a higher market share and charges higher prices on all trips originating from the dominant airport-and the role of switching costs, such as frequent flyer programs, in generating this premium (Lederman, 2008) . Also related is the literature on network externalities and, in particular, the papers that investigate the effects of product compatibility on market outcomes Shapiro, 1985 and 1994; Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Economides, 1989 )-more precisely, the empirical papers that consider the effects of ATM surcharge fees on banks' optimal ATMs network size and deposit account pricing Stango, 2008 and Gowrisankaran and Krainer, 2011) . One contribution of the present paper is to empirically document that the mutual fund industry shares some key features with network industries.
This paper contributes to a second strand of literature on multiproduct firms and productline breadth. The theoretical literature suggests that firms offer multiple products to prevent the entry of rival firms (Schmalensee, 1978; Shaked and Sutton, 1990 ) and to increase their market share and profitability (Lancaster, 1979) . A few papers empirically investigate the impact of a product-line extension, finding that firms are able to increase prices and sales once they extend their product line (Kadiyali, Vilcassim and Chintagunta, 1999; Draganska and Jain, 2005) . Unlike these papers, we illustrate how an industry's institutional arrangements can generate demand for firms' varieties, as well as their implications for competition, industry equilibrium, market structure and concentration.
Finally, the paper is related to the literature on mutual funds. Most papers analyze mutual funds' returns and/or portfolios, and only recently have a few papers focused on the role of families and on the industrial organization of the industry. Khorana and Servaes (1999) empirically examine the determinants of mutual fund starts and find that economies of scale and scope, the family's prior performance, and the overall level of funds invested are the main factors that induce families to set up new funds. Khorana and Servaes (2007) investigate the determinants of market shares and document that families that charge lower fees, perform better, and start more funds relative to the competition have a higher market share. Massa (1998 and 2003) argues that families use market segmentation and fund proliferation to exploit investors' heterogeneity, to limit competition, and to increase market coverage. Wahal 
Background: Retail and Institutional Funds
The purpose of this section is to shed light on the key differences between the retail and institutional segments of the mutual fund industry. For a more thorough description of the industry, see Gremillion (2005) .
Retail mutual funds are aimed toward individual investors-i.e., households-and taxadvantaged individual retirement accounts have been instrumental in the growth of the retail segment in the last decades. 4 According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2008), many of today's mutual fund owners were introduced to mutual fund investing through retirement plans. For example, 59 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicated that they purchased their first fund through an employer-sponsored retirement plan, and that fraction increases to 68 percent for households that purchased mutual funds after 2000.
Thus, retirement plans are, today, the most common source through which individuals invest in mutual funds: Fifty-one percent of households that owned mutual funds viewed retirement plans as their main fund-purchase source (ICI, 2008). As a result, Cohen and Schmidt (2009) report that in 2004, more than 60 percent of new flows into non-money market mutual funds were due to retirement accounts.
Two main types of individual retirement plans exist: 1) employer-sponsored definedcontribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and 2) IRA/Keogh plans. Both types have an almost 50-percent share of total retirement assets, but they differ in several aspects. 5 An employer-sponsored plan is a benefit an employer provides to its employees. Thus, the em- Hence, a fund family with a larger number of funds is appealing to employers with a large number of employees, who may have heterogeneous preferences over their portfolio choices (because of age, income, or idiosyncratic taste). For instance, Agnew, Balduzzi and Sundén (2003) study allocations in retirement accounts and find that equity allocations are higher for males, married investors, younger investors, investors with higher earnings, and those with more seniority on the job. 6
5 Total individual-account retirement assets amounted to $6.767 trillion in 2004, according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2008). These assets were almost equally split between the two main forms of retirement plans: $3.384 trillion in employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans, and $3.383 trillion in IRA/Keogh accounts. 6 Overall, these considerations suggest that the number of funds that a family offers plays a different role in determining market shares in the retail and in the institutional segments.
Thus, we expect that demand spillovers differs across the two segments. The next Section presents a simple model that investigates how these demand spillovers affect market structure and market conduct. The model will guide the empirical analysis of Section 5.
A Simple Model
In this section, we introduce a simple model that adapts the theoretical framework of Sutton (1991) to the mutual fund industry. The main goal of the model is to investigate in the simplest way how the demand for a firm's product portfolio shapes competitive outcomes in the industry. More precisely, we make the simplest assumptions on the demand-side of "First, participants choose to invest their savings in a small number of funds-typically no more than three or four-regardless of the number of funds their plans offer. Second, a substantial fraction of participants tend to allocate their contributions evenly among the funds they choose. Third, there is little relation between the proportion of contributions that participants allocate to equity funds (equity allocation) and the proportion of equity funds that their plans offer (equity exposure)." See, also, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2004) for the impact of 401(k) plan design on saving outcomes.
the model (assuming, in particular, that the decision-maker chooses funds of a single family, rather than deriving it from first principles-i.e., shopping costs), and focus on two key families' supply choices: the number of funds offered and the fees. In turn, these choices determine the equilibrium number of families and, thus, market concentration. The main advantage of this setup is that it delivers testable implications that have intuitive empirical counterparts.
Demand-Consider a decision maker selecting a mutual-fund family-for example, an employer with a large number of employees with heterogeneous preferences over portfolio choices. The decision maker chooses among families of funds that are vertically differentiated, differing by the number of funds offered N j and the price p j . The decision maker's indirect utility from choosing family j is equal to:
The parameter α N measures the importance of demand spillovers: A higher α N makes the number of funds N J that a family offers more important for the decision maker. ǫ j is a preference shock, assumed to be i.i.d. across consumers and families, distributed according to the type I extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974) . Thus, the market share of family j is equal to:
.
(1)
Supply-The industry is populated by a large number of homogeneous potential entrants (families) that compete by offering funds and by charging fees. A family j offering N j funds has a cost function equal to
where K > 0 is a set-up cost and F > 0 is a fixed cost per fund. Thus, the cost function C (N j ) assumes that fixed costs are strictly positive (so there are always economies of scale) and that the introduction of each fund affects families' fixed costs exclusively.
Using the market share (1) and the cost function (2), we obtain family profits as
where M is the exogenous size of the market. Each family j chooses the number N * j of funds and the price p * j that maximize its profits π (N j , p j ) . The first-order conditions for optimality are:
where s j = s N * j , p * j . Free entry determines the number S * of active families in equilibrium. Thus, ignoring integer constraints, free entry drives down profits to zero-i.e., π N * j , p * j = 0.
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium, in a large market M :
, the price p * is equal to α N αp , and the number S * of families is equal to α N α N −1 .
(ii) If α N ≤ 1, the number N * of funds offered by each family is equal to α N K (1−α N )F , the price p * is equal to 1 αp , and the number S * of families is equal to (1 
Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, p * j = p * and N * j = N * . Thus, s * j = 1/S * , and we can rewrite the first-order conditions as:
and the free-entry condition as:
We can substitute equations (3) and (4) into the zero-profit condition (5), rearrange and obtain:
(i) Consider a large market-i.e., M → +∞-and suppose S * → +∞. Then, the lefthand side of equation (6) diverges to positive infinity, while the right-hand side of equation (6) diverges to negative infinity since its sign is equal to αpK(S−1)
However, this is impossible. Thus, the only possibility is α N + S * (1 − α N ) = 0, which we can solve for S * as (3) and (4), we obtain that the price p * is equal to α N αp and the number N * of funds is equal to (α N −1)M αpF .
(ii) In a large market-i.e., M → +∞-the left-hand side of equation (6) diverges to positive infinity and the right-hand side has a positive sign. Thus, S * has to diverge to positive infinity, as well. Moreover, letting M → +∞ and S * → +∞ into equations (3) and (4), we obtain that the price p * is equal to 1 αp and the number N * of funds is equal to (4), and noting that 1 S * = 0, we obtain
Proposition 1 highlights the stark effects of demand-side spillovers on firms' equilibrium strategies. In particular, two distinct types of equilibria arise, depending on whether the parameter α N is larger or smaller than one-i.e., the rate at which fixed costs increase as families add new funds. If demand spillovers are strong (α N > 1), competition induces families to offer a large number of funds rather than low fees. As a result, the industry is concentrated even in large markets. However, if demand spillovers are weak (α N ≤ 1), the number of funds that each family offers is limited, fees are lower, and the industry is more fragmented in larger markets. In particular, the number S * of families converges to a finite constant when spillovers are strong; instead S * grows at the same rate as market size M when spillovers are weak, implying that the number of families is larger if spillovers are weak. The intuition for the results of Proposition 1 closely follows the arguments of Shaked and Sutton (1987) . When decision makers place a high value on the number of funds-i.e., the dimension of vertical differentiation between families-a family that offers more funds than its competitors can undercut their fees and gain a proportionally larger market share since offering more funds affects fixed rather than marginal costs. Thus, only a few large families can survive in equilibrium, and the industry stays concentrated even in a large market. When, instead, decision makers place a relatively low value on the number of funds (α N ≤ 1), increasing its funds offerings and undercutting rivals' fees is not profitable, in particular when firms are already choosing low fees that almost equal marginal cost-i.e., zero. Moreover, in a large market, even very low fees generate enough variable profits to cover fixed costs. Thus, many families survive in equilibrium, and the industry is fragmented. affects the aggregate number of funds offered to investors, providing a theoretical explanation for the existence of a large number of funds, which has been viewed as a puzzle (Massa, 1997) .
Corollary 2
The total number of funds N * S * is higher and the market share M N * S * of each fund is lower if spillovers are higher (higher α N ).
Proof. Using the expressions for N * and S * derived in the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain that N * S * = α N M αpF . Thus, N * S * is increasing and M N * S * is decreasing in α N , the extent of demand-side spillovers.
In summary, although the life cycle of the mutual fund industry, like that of any other industry, is clearly more complex than our simple theoretical framework, the model can explain salient features of competition among fund families. Furthermore, the analysis of Shaked and Sutton (1987) and Sutton (1991) indicates that the substance of the results does not depend on some of the simplifying assumptions imposed. In particular, the results are robust to several important extensions: 1) heterogeneous preference α N across consumers;
2) additional horizontal or vertical characteristics that affect investors' utility function; 3)
heterogeneous fixed costs F across firms; and 4) sequential entry of firms.
Empirical Analysis
This section first describes the data employed in this study. It then illustrates some striking differences between the institutional and retail segments of the mutual fund industry. In particular, in the retail segment, families offer more funds, funds have higher fees, the market is more concentrated, and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment. These patterns are exactly what Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 imply if spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the following subsections measure and compare demand spillovers in the two segments.
Data
The empirical analysis is based on the mutual fund database compiled by the Center for where j denotes a fund, i denotes a family, k denotes a category/investment objective (i.e., money market, U.S. equities, etc.), m denotes a month and t denotes a year. Fund Fees are equal to regular expenses, plus one seventh of front-and rear-end fees charged by the family.
Hence, we are assuming a seven-year investment horizon, as in previous studies (Sirri and Tufano, 1989; Khorana and Servaes, 2007) . Fund Turnover follows the CRSP definition.
We construct most family-level variables by averaging the fund-level variables of all funds within a family and within each segment (retail or institutional), weighting each fund by its assets. Moreover, in order to partially take into account the heterogeneity in family strategies across different categories of funds, we construct some family-level variables by taking the weighted average of fund characteristics calculated as deviations from the average 8 Fund sponsors frequently offer different share classes of a single portfolio to investors, primarily load or no-load classes. The three share classes commonly offered by multiple-class funds are denoted A, B and C. The A class is the traditional class in which investors pay a front-end load and an annual 12b-1 fee of 25 to 35 basis points to compensate brokers. In comparison, the B and C classes have no front-end loads but may charge a contingent deferred sales load (CDSL) upon exit and usually charge higher annual 12b-1 fees of about 1 percent. See Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2009) for an analysis of funds' decision to issue multiple share classes. characteristics of all funds in the same category. For example, the aggregate performance of family i in year t is measured as the Family Excess Return:
where, as before, j denotes a fund, i denotes a family, k denotes a category/investment objective and t denotes a year. ω jikt is fund j's share of family i's total assets in year t; R jikt is the return of fund j of family i belonging to category k in year t; and ω l·kt is fund l's share of category k ′ s assets in year t. Thus, l ω l·kt R l·kt is the weighted average return of all funds belonging to category k in year t, and R jikt − l ω l·kt R l·kt is the year t-abnormal return of fund j of family i belonging to category k. Thus, Family Excess Return it adjusts for all factors that may affect all funds in the same investment category (Khorana and Servaes, 2007) . Moreover, we also construct the variable Family Variance Excess Return as j ω jikt (R jikt − l ω l·kt R l·kt ) 2 to control for the heterogeneity of fund returns within a family. Similarly, we construct the variable Family Fees and Family Turnover as j ω jikt x jikt , where x jikt is the fee or the turnover, respectively, of fund j of family i belonging to category k in year t.
The main explanatory variables of interest measure the number of products offered by a family in the corresponding segment (retail or institutional), and we measure it in two complementary ways. The first one-Family Funds-is the total number of funds offered by a family. Since we are treating each share class offered by a fund as a separate entity, Family Funds may, perhaps, overestimate the number of funds available to investors. Thus, we also construct a second measure that is not affected by this potential mismeasurement: Family Categories, the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one fund. Hence, Family Categories performs an important robustness check (which we could have performed by defining a fund as the aggregation of all share classes of a unique portfolio), and has the additional advantage of providing a measure of families' offerings that emphasizes product-line breadth across different investment objectives. CRSP offers several distinct classifications of funds' categories/investment objectives. We employ the most-detailed classification available, the Lipper objective codes classification. Thus, the variable Family Categories is a count of the number of distinct Lipper objective codes offered by a fund family.
Finally, we obtain from the CBP some variables that we use as instruments in our empirical analysis: Total Establishments and Employment Financial Sector are defined exactly as in CBP, where the financial sector refers to either SIC 60 or NAICS 52; Wage is calculated as total payroll divided by total employment, and Wage Financial Sector is total payroll in the financial sector divided by Employment Financial Sector. All these variables refer to the county in which the zip code of the family's address reported in CRSP is located. Moreover, we also calculate the distance of the family headquarters from New York City as
where lat j and long j are the latitude and longitude of zip code j. Zip code 10012 is used for all families located in New York City. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
The first two columns of data refer to the retail segment of the market. There are 66,270
fund-year observations in this segment. On average, a retail fund has a market share of approximately one percent, and there is considerable heterogeneity in the size of funds:
The standard deviation of the market share is equal to 5. The last two columns present summary statistics for the institutional segment of the market. As Section 3 argues, demand spillovers should not play the same role in the two segments of the market. Indeed, Table 1 presents some suggestive patterns. The average institutional fund has a larger market share, is cheaper and younger, yields a higher return, and has a lower turnover than a retail fund. Interestingly, the average institutional fund belongs to a smaller family than a retail fund does-a family with 60 funds spanning 18 different categories. if spillovers are stronger in the retail segment than in the institutional segment. Thus, the goal of the next subsections is to measure these spillovers by estimating a demand system in each segment, enriching the demand system given by equation (1) of the theoretical model. 9
A Graphical Comparison

Demand Spillovers in the Retail Segment
We proceed in three complementary ways to measure demand spillovers in the retail segment of the industry. First, we investigate whether a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals has a proportionally larger market share (and assets under management).
Second, we investigate whether a fund whose family offers more funds or categories than its rivals has a larger market share. Third, we investigate whether a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals has a larger market share in the categories that it offers.
Family-level Evidence
To investigate the importance of demand spillovers at the family level, we estimate a demand system rearranging the market share equation (1) of the theoretical model (see Berry, 1994) , also including additional variables that control for factors that the model does not consider.
Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation: 10
The dependent variable Log(Family Market Share it ) is the log of a family's aggregate market share-i.e., the total net assets of family i in year t divided by the total net assets of all families in year t. The key variable of interest is Variety it , defined as either Family Funds-i.e., the total number of funds offered by a family-or Family Categories-i.e., the total number of categories/investment objectives in which a family offers at least one 9 An alternative empirical design may be to perform one family-level regression and one fund-level regression, using dummy variables to distinguish the key coefficients of retail funds from institutional funds. While this is certainly feasible, the main advantage of the empirical design followed below is that it does not constrain the coefficients of the additional control variables to be the same in the retail and institutional segments. 10 More precisely, equation (7) obtains after taking logs in equation (1), recognizing that the log of the denominator of the right-hand side is constant within a year. Thus, the year fixed effect in equation (7) captures it. Hence, the previous supply-side arguments could invalidate the tests of our predictions.
Thus, as in a standard demand and supply estimation, in order to identify demand-side spillovers, we employ variables that shift Family Funds and Family Categories for supply-side reasons. Specifically, an influential economic geography literature has empirically documented the spatial agglomeration of firms belonging to the same industry (for a summary, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999), and a few papers have shown that firms located in these areas where an industry concentrates are, on average, larger than firms in the same industry outside such areas (for evidence across industries, see Holmes and
Stevens, 2002; for evidence on the mutual fund industry, see Table 1 
in Christoffersen and
Sarkissian, 2009). The general reason is that firms located where an industry concentrates enjoy larger labor pools and larger flows of ideas (Marshall, 1920), thereby growing in size.
Indeed, applying these insights to the mutual fund industry, Christoffersen and Sarkissian In addition, it is important to note that the thrust of our empirical analysis relies on the comparison between spillovers in the retail and institutional segments of the market. Our results will differ across these two segments, and reasonable arguments against the validity of the instruments should account for this difference. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 present IV estimates of the coefficients of equation (7) . The positive coefficients of Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)
indicate that investors are more likely to allocate their assets in families that offer more funds, consistent with our demand spillovers arguments. However, strictly speaking, the positive coefficients of Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories) in columns (1) and (2) do not necessarily imply demand spillovers. For example, if, for whatever reason, investors allocate their money randomly across funds, then, mechanically, families that offer more funds would have a higher market share. Nevertheless, the coefficients are estimated to be statistically larger than one, indicating that families that offer more funds (categories) have a proportionally larger market share. The magnitude of the effects is also non-trivial:
A family that offers ten-percent more funds has a 14.8-percent higher market share, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories has a 20.1-percent higher market share.
Fund-level Evidence
To investigate the importance of demand-side spillovers at the fund level, we enrich equation (7) as follows:
The dependent variable Log(Fund Market Share jkit ) is the log of the market share of fund j in category k belonging to family i in year t. Variety it is either Family Funds year fixed effect and ǫ jkit is an idiosyncratic unobserved component. Hence, equation (8) is similar to equation (7), but it uses a richer set of characteristics at the individual fund level, thus more carefully controlling funds' observable heterogeneity across families. offered by its family is larger. This is a strong confirmation of the results of Table 2 and reinforces the idea that demand spillovers play an important role in the retail segment of the market. For example, according to the coefficients of specifications (5) and (6), a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals has a 3.7-percent higher market share for each fund of the same family, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals has a 5.3-percent higher market share for each fund of the same family. Furthermore, the coefficients of Family Excess Return is positive in all specifications, although sometimes not significant, confirming the importance of within-family performance spillovers, as in Nanda, Wang and Zheng (2004) and Ivković (2004) .
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 3 report the estimates of the coefficients of equation (8) obtained on a sample of S&P 500 index funds only. These regressions are particularly interesting because the sample is restricted to (almost) homogeneous products that passively follow an index. Thus, we should expect the effect of demand spillovers on this sample of S&P 500 index funds to be greater than on the entire sample, for two main reasons. First, fund heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) should play a limited role on index funds.
Second, an S&P 500 index fund may be a "focal" fund in which investors "park" their assets when they unload them from other funds within the family. Indeed, the coefficients reported in columns (7) and (8) (7) and (8) than in columns (5) and (6), confirming the importance of demand spillovers. More precisely, the market share of the S&P 500 index fund offered by a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals is 7.6-percent higher, and the market share of the S&P 500 index fund offered by a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals is 14.6-percent higher.
Category-level Evidence
We now investigate the importance of demand-side spillovers by examining how the number of family products affects the family's market share in each Lipper objective code. These regressions serve two main purposes: 1) Perform a robustness check. Since the fund-level regressions treat each share class offered by a fund as a separate entity, the results reported in Table 3 may overestimate the number of independent observations, potentially biasing some coefficients. 2) Investigate the role of spillovers across different investment objectives, rather than across different funds.
With these goals in mind, we estimate the following regression:
Log (Cat-Fam Market Share kit ) = αLog(Variety it )+βX kit +γZ it +ζ k +η t +ǫ kit . (9) The dependent variable is the log of the market share of all funds in category k belonging (5) and (6) Log(Family Categories)-are significantly higher than zero in all specifications. The signs of these coefficients indicate that, on average, the market share of a category of funds is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered by its family is larger. This confirms the results of Tables 2 and 3 that demand spillovers play an important role in the retail segment of the market, and indicates that those results were not an artifact of measurement error. In particular, the coefficients of specifications (5) and (6) imply that a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals has a 6.3-percent higher market share for each category of funds of the same family, and a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals has a nine-percent higher market share for each category of funds of the same family.
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 4 report the estimates of the coefficients of equation (9) obtained on the category of S&P 500 index funds only. In these specifications, we use our supply shifters only to instrument the endogenous variables Family Funds or Family Categories, since instrumenting Family Fees generates unstable results. With this caveat in mind, the coefficients reported in columns (7) and (8) confirm that the effect of spillovers is greater on this sample of S&P 500 index funds: The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds-Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)-are larger in columns (7) and (8) than in columns (5) and (6), confirming the importance of demand spillovers. More precisely, the market share of the S&P 500 index category of funds offered by a family that offers ten-percent more funds than its rivals is 11-percent higher, and the market share of the S&P 500 index category of funds offered by a family that offers ten-percent more categories than its rivals is 22-percent higher.
Demand Spillovers in the Institutional Segment
We now measure the magnitude of demand spillovers in the institutional segment of the market and compare it with the magnitudes estimated previously in the retail segment. This comparison is useful to understanding the differential patterns between the institutional and retail segments highlighted in Figure 3 . In particular, Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 of our simple model suggest that these differential patterns are the natural equilibrium outcomes if demand spillovers differ in the two segments of the market.
We investigate the magnitude of demand spillovers in the institutional segment by estimating the same equations (7), (8) and (9) Fees-with the same supply-side shifters described in Section 5.3.1: total employment in the financial sector; the total number of establishments; the distance of the headquarters from New York City; and the average excess return and average variance of excess returns of rival families. Table 5 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (7)-i.e., the family-level regressions-on the sample of families of institutional funds. The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is (the log of) the aggregate market share of the family-i.e.,
Log(Family Market Share it ). The table shows that we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of the two variables capturing the variety of families' funds-Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)-are lower than one in specifications (1) and (2) . Thus, there is no evidence that families that offer more funds (categories) have a proportionally larger market share. This suggests that demand spillovers do not play an important role in the institutional segment, in sharp contrast to the evidence from the retail segment reported in Table 2 . Table 6 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (8)-i.e., the fund-level regressions-on the sample of institutional funds. The dependent variable in the specifications (1) to (8) is the log of each fund's market share-i.e., Log(Fund Market Share jkit ).
The coefficients of the two variables capturing the family variety of funds-Log(Family Funds) and Log(Family Categories)-are negative and/or not significantly different from zero. Thus, these coefficients confirm the results of Table 5 : On average, the market share of (and the assets managed by) an institutional fund is not higher when the number of institutional funds (categories) offered by its family is higher. This corroborates that demand spillovers do not play an important role in the institutional segment, in sharp contrast to the evidence from the retail segment reported in Table 3 . Moreover, it is interesting to note that the coefficients of all other family-level variables-i.e., Family Excess Return, Family Variance Excess Return, and Family Turnover-are insignificant in almost all specifications, reinforcing the idea of weaker within-family spillovers in the institutional segment than in the retail segment of the market. Table 7 reports the estimates of the coefficients of equation (9) Table 4 . Furthermore, the coefficients of all other family-level variables-i.e., Family Excess Return, Family Variance Excess Return, and Family Turnover-are insignificant in most specifications, providing further evidence that within-family spillovers in the institutional segment are not as relevant as in the retail segment of the market.
Robustness Checks and Alternative Hypotheses
We now present robustness checks using an alternative set of instruments and discuss in detail two leading alternative hypotheses, presenting arguments against them.
Alternative Instruments. We now verify the robustness of the results to several potential concerns about the validity of the instruments. As highlighted in Section 5.3.1, the validity of the instruments relies on two main assumptions: 1) each fund family represents a small fraction of Employment Financial Sector in the cross-section of U.S. counties;
and 2) the exclusion restriction that, for example, Employment Financial Sector in Los Angeles or Boston does not directly affect the demand and market share of American Funds or Fidelity, whose headquarters are in Los Angeles and Boston, respectively. While, in principle, we could subtract each family's employees from Employment Financial Sector to directly avoid any reverse causality concern, CRSP does not, unfortunately, report this information, and we are not aware of another public dataset that does. Moreover, this alternative procedure would not directly address concerns about the plausibility of our exclusion restriction. Furthermore, another potential concern about our instruments is that families' location is endogenous. For example, Employment Financial Sector could affect the number of family funds-as this paper posits-and other unobserved dimensions of a family's "quality" of offerings, such as financial advice. If this is the case, the estimates of demand spillovers may be biased.
To address all these concerns, in the spirit of the empirical literature on differentiated products following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we use supply-side variables of other families as instruments for each family's endogenous measure of varieties. Specifically, for each family i, we compute the average Employment Financial Sector, Total Establishments and Distance from NYC of all families whose headquarters are located in a different county than family i, and we use those as instruments for Family Funds and
Family Categories of family i. In oligopoly markets, these are valid instruments since rival families' cost shifters affect equilibrium best-responses and, thus, families' equilibrium characteristics, such as product varieties. In addition, by construction, these instruments do not suffer from reverse causality and do not directly affect families' demands and market shares. Moreover, as the empirical literature on differentiated products since Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) advocates, they are arguably uncorrelated with each family's unobservable characteristics. Tables 2 and 5 , respectively, indicating that our results are robust to potential concerns about the validity of the instruments.
We have also performed the fund-level and category-level regressions using this alternative set of instruments. The results (omitted) confirm that, on average, the market share of a fund or of a family's category of funds is larger if the number of funds (categories) offered by its family is larger in the retail segment, but not in the institutional segment. These additional checks further corroborate the robustness of our results on the importance of demand spillovers in the retail segment, but not in the institutional segment.
Economies of Scale and Scope. Khorana and Servaes (1999) suggest that economies of scale and scope are important in the mutual fund industry. These economies may induce larger families to launch more new funds, and they may also constitute a barrier to entry for new families, thus potentially explaining some of the empirical patterns documented. Similarly, in an influential paper, Schmalensee (1978) argues that incumbent firms may choose to offer multiple products in order to "fill the product space," thus crowding out additional entrants. (Bonanno, 1987 , analyzes Schmalensee's argument, showing that incumbents deter entry through product specification, rather than through product proliferation.)
While economies of scale and scope are key features that shape competitive outcomes in the mutual fund industry, we reiterate that our empirical model identifies investors' demand, since the instruments used in our empirical model exploit exogenous supply-side shifters of the number of funds and number of categories offered by each family. In addition, our analysis reveals striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market. All supply-side factors-including economies of scale and scope-should not differ between retail and institutional funds. Moreover, our results stand when we restrict our analysis to (almost) homogenous products such as S&P 500 index funds. Furthermore, several families offer funds in both the retail and the institutional segments of the market, presumably sharing any costs savings due to lower research, product development, and administrative costs. Thus, it is not clear why the two segments of the market exhibit such stark differences. But our argument rests on demand spillovers, and we highlighted in Section 3 why these spillovers differ between the retail and institutional segments. In particular, Park (2008) documents that advertising expenditure has increased over time in the mutual fund industry (in particular, for no-load funds), and this increase may have fostered concentration. However, it is unlikely that this alternative hypothesis can explain all our empirical findings, for several reasons. First, we wish to emphasize that our empirical model is designed to precisely control for spurious correlations due to unobserved factors, including advertising and research expenditures. In particular, the instruments that we employ in the empirical analysis exploit exogenous variations in the number of funds and number of categories offered. Second, many families offer funds in both the retail and the institutional segments of the market, and, presumably, the effects of advertising and research (in particular) are not confined to a single segment of the market. Thus, it is not immediately obvious why market conduct and market structure respond differently to the same input. 
Conclusions
This paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the role of demand for firms' product varieties and demand spillovers in determining market conduct and market structure in the mutual fund industry. The model adapts Sutton's (1991) endogenous sunk costs theory, highlighting that the magnitude of spillovers determines the industry equilibrium. If demand for firms' product portfolios and, thus, demand spillovers are strong, competition induces families to offer a large number of funds rather than low fees. As a result, the industry remains concentrated even in large markets. Instead, if demand for firms' product portfolios and spillovers are weak, the number of funds that each family offers is limited, fees are lower, and the industry is more fragmented in larger markets.
Aggregate empirical patterns reveal striking differences between the retail and institutional segments of the market: in the retail segment, families offer more funds; funds have higher fees; the market is more concentrated and the total number of funds is larger than in the institutional segment. These patterns are exactly the outcomes predicted by the theoretical model if spillovers are stronger in the retail than in the institutional segment. Indeed, the empirical analysis provides strong evidence that these spillovers are stronger in the retail segment of the market.
The ideas of this paper are potentially useful in understanding several market outcomes in all industries in which consumers prefer to purchase from a single supplier (banking, commercial aircraft, supermarkets, etc.). For example, an interesting question, left for future research, is what are the determinants and the effects of mergers in such markets.
A First-stage Regressions (1) and (3) refer to retail funds, and specifications (2) and (4) refer to institutional funds.
The signs of the coefficients of the instruments are largely as expected. In particular, on average, a larger employment in the financial sector, relative to the total employment, in the same county in which the family has its headquarters corresponds to a larger number of funds or to a larger number of categories offered by the family. This is true in both the retail and institutional segments. Moreover, the instruments are jointly significant: the F -tests are equal to 24.06, 14.07, 23.91, and 13.22, respectively, in specifications (1)-(4).
To appreciate the magnitude implied by the coefficients, we construct the fitted number of funds from the coefficients of column (1) . These fitted values imply, for example, that the average number of funds offered by a family whose headquarters are in New York, NY is twice as large as a family's whose headquarters are in Austin, TX: 33 funds versus 16.6 funds. where Fund Tna is the fund's total net assets. Fund Fees are equal to regular expenses, plus one seventh of front-and rear-end fees charged by the family. Fund Age is the number of years since the fund was established. Fund Return is the annual return of the fund. Fund Turnover is the fund turnover ratio, expressed as a percentage of the fund. Family Funds is the number of funds offered by the fund family. Family Categories is the number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one fund. Family Excess Return is the asset-weighted, objectiveadjusted average family abnormal return. Family Variance of Excess Return is the asset-weighted, objective-adjusted variance of family abnormal returns. Family Turnover is the asset-weighted average turnover across all the family's funds. Total Establishments is the number of establishments in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. Employment Financial Sector is the total employment in the financial sector in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. Wage is total payroll divided by total employment in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. Wage Financial Sector is total payroll in the financial sector divided by Employment Financial Sector in the county corresponding to the zip code of the family address reported in CRSP. These last four variables are obtained from the County Business Patterns. Distance from New York is the distance of the family address from New York City. All data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether an institutional fund whose family offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the institutional segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all institutional mutual funds. Specifications (7) and (8) Notes: This table reports the results of Instrumental Variable regressions that investigate whether a category of institutional funds offered by a family that offers more funds or categories than its rivals in the institutional segment has a larger market share. Specifications (1)-(6) employ the sample of all institutional category-family pairs. Specifications (7) and (8) (1) and (2) refer to the retail segment; specifications (3) and (4) Notes: This table reports the results of the first-stage regressions. The dependent variable is the log of number of retail funds offered by a family in specification (1); the log of number of institutional funds offered by a family in specification (2); the log of number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one retail fund in specification (3); and the log of number of Lipper categories in which the fund family offers at least one institutional fund in specification (4) . The independent variables are defined in the text. All regressions further include year fixed effects. The data refer to the years from 1999 to 2007. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
